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Roger A. Lohmann, Ph.D. 
West Virginia University 
What fools these mortals be... 
           Pan, Mid-Summer Nights Dream 
The Legacy of The Mortals. . . 
There is a place in a high mountain valley of Central Appalachia where an 
ancient stone monument, said by area resident to be at least 100 years old, 
contains the faintly visible legend, " . . . And be fair to unicorns."  According 
to local lore it was erected by the brilliant but eccentric local leaders with an 
overarching concern for social justice.  Little is known about these heroic 
figures, Isaac Mathew (“I M”) Mortal and his brother Uriah Raphael Junior 
(“U R II”) are said by locals to have been deeply concerned with the turn of 
events in the Appalachian Mountains in the 1880's, as rapacious loggers 
"clear cut" virtually all of the primeval forests of the region.  The brothers 
believed firmly in the existence of unicorns in the Appalachian Mountains 
and feared very much that the clear cutting would destroy their habitat and 
render Appalachian unicorns extinct.   
Consequently, they set out to protect the unicorns by seeking to instill a 
sense of justice to the lumbermen. They did this by erecting a series of moral 
dicta on stone standards and placing them at appropriate strategic spots 
throughout the mountain region.  Unfortunately, history records the major 
result.  Their urging went unheeded, and clear cutting proceeded apace, with 
the result that virtually no virgin forest remains in the Appalachian 
Mountains today.  Also, all of their moral stellae were eventually buried, 
smashed or carried off by the advancing loggers, except for a single, 
remaining tablet quoted above with its whimsical message.  And as the 
Mortals feared there hasn't been a single unicorn sighted in the Appalachians 
during the past century. 
At first glance, one is tempted to smile at such whimsy, set it aside and 
forget it.  Questions tend, however, to linger for several reasons:  First, there 
is an overarching ethical issue involved:  Are unicorns, like all other 
creatures, deserving of fairness, as the Mortals assumed?  Presumably so.  
This however, raises a pair of even more troubling empirical issues:   Has 
anyone ever actually witnessed a case of unfair treatment of a unicorn?  And, 
if one were to encounter a unicorn, what actions would constitute fair 
treatment of the creature?  Another related question is what would constitute 
sufficient evidence of unjust treatment of unicorns?   What, in other words, 




. . . And Efficiency 
h  The issue of efficiency has been of concern in human services for at 
least seventy years. The issue arose as early as 1910 and has been of greater 
or lesser concern ever since (Lubove, p. 161). The original case for organized, 
routinized and administered service delivery made by Porter Lee rests 
heavily on claims of efficiency  (Lee, 1929). However, there is no available 
evidence that any significant progress has been made in our ability to 
recognize, define, or actually achieve greater "efficiency" in service delivery 
during that entire time.   
Unquestionably, the "popularity curve" of efficiency concerns also closely 
parallels the growth of the "scientific management" movement. Likewise, 
efficiency has always been a favorite buzzword of the "practical" and business 
interests on community boards and government agencies.  Whether there is 
any actual substance to the issue of efficient service delivery, however, is 
seldom subject to any careful examination.  Like the Mortals’ stone dictum, 
the sanction to "be efficient" is omnipresent in the contemporary world of the 
human services.  And, just as they will presumably be fair to unicorns, if and 
when the circumstances arise, so also most people in human services can 
probably be counted upon to act efficiently if the appropriate circumstances 
warrant.  The question asked here –  in all seriousness – is whether the 
circumstances for "efficient" behavior ever, in fact, arise in human 
service settings?   Or is this, like the issue of justice for unicorns essentially 
a matter of a sensible rule made irrelevant simply because the circumstances 
of its application never arise? 
The issue is considerably more complex that it may at first appear. Before 
we can appreciate the full complexity of the matter, we need to establish one 
simple rule:  If efficiency is to be accorded status as a scientific evaluative 
concept, it may not be treated as a tautology:  It must be defined, then 
defined operationally and measured with recognized, established, generally 
acceptable measures.  If things are efficient or inefficient simply because 
someone somewhere claims that they are, the concept is accorded a privileged 
status unsuitable for use in meaningful evaluation.  In that case, its uses are 
strictly rhetorical and propagandistic.  If controversial issues or "hard cases" 
of possible efficiency are to be resolvable, efficiency must be a testable 
concept.  And to be testable it must have empirical referents – an established 
meaning, an operational definition and measurable consequences 
intersubjectivity observable in the public domain open to all of us.  This 
involves nothing more than the kind of standard all students are taught in 
entry level courses in numerous disciplines. Further, before any particular 
program, service, or action may be judged to be "efficient" or "inefficient", the 
supporting evidence should be sufficiently clear-cut to generate a consensus 
of agreement among fair-minded disinterested observers. 
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If these simple, basic criteria are applied to the present "state of the art" 
of efficiency measurement, certain conclusions are unavoidable: (a) There is 
currently widespread agreement on any nominal definition of efficiency;  (b) 
no satisfactory operational definition or measure of the concept of efficiency 
has been published anywhere in the human services literature;  (c) No 
published record exists anywhere in the human services literature of even a 
single successful contemporary measurement of the efficiency of an actual, 
existing service at any level of measurement;  (d)  All efforts to operationalize 
and measure efficiency encounter similar overwhelming difficulties; and  (e) 
As a result of these difficulties, efficiency cannot be accorded any serious 
status as an objective or scientific concept.  Therefore, the primary use of the 
concept of efficiency in the human services today is, as it has been throughout 
its entire history, is primarily rhetorical and ideological and not evaluative.  
Nominal Definitions 
References to efficiency in the human services management literature 
sometimes define it as "the ratio of inputs to outputs" (Anthony and Young, 
1985; Patti, 1983, 163-164).  In human service administration, this concept of 
the ratio of inputs to outputs is the most commonly cited definition of 
efficiency (Patti, 1983, 163-164). As we shall see below, this is a very 
misleading notion, borrowed from engineering and resting on a physical 
analogy. One also encounters other definitions which may be related.  
Ramanathan, for example, defines efficiency as "doing your job with a 
minimum use of resources" (Ramanathan, p. 6). This may appear to be a 
tempting notion, but if that definition holds it revolves into a paradox: If so, 
the most efficient thing to do is nothing, thereby expending no (the most 
efficient amount) of resources. Brace, Elkin, Robinson and Steinberg, define 
efficiency as the ratio of effort to outcome (op. cit., p. 8).  Efficiency, according 
to Porter Lee, is the 'ratio between effort and result’ (Lee, 1937, p.19). Such 
efforts to measure efforts, however, have never been quite able to escape the 
paradoxes of “best laid plans” subjectivity:  “We tried really hard, but didn’t 
get the result (outcome) we expected. Does that make us inefficient, or merely 
ineffective?” Or, does that reduce efficiency and effectiveness to one and the 
same thing? 
No further elaboration on measurement of these notions is indicated in 
any of the above sources.  The fact that Lee, in particular, neither defined nor 
spelled out the nature of this alleged test is very revealing, given his 
statements about submitting our efforts to the "test of efficiency". The truth 
of the matter is that in the ordinary social science meaning of the term, no 
such 'test' of the efficiency of human services existed in 1929 when Lee wrote, 
and none exists today.  Rather than any standard or recognized test of 
efficiency corresponding to some accepted standard definition, what we have 
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is a whole series of ad hoc operational measures.  The situation is comparable 
to measuring intelligence with tests of attitudes, beliefs and influences. 
Economics Is No Help 
Koplin, Leibenstein and other economists refer to this as the 'common 
sense' approach, which they distinguish from economic uses of the term.  
(Koplin, 1971, p. 130; Leibenstein, 1976; Greenfield, et. al, 1979) In economics 
the term is actually seldom used, and when it is, it is used in ways which 
would render it largely inapplicable to the kind of uses commonly applied in 
human services.  Typically, economic efficiency refers to a condition of 
exchange systems rather than production. (C.f. Heilbroner and Thurow, 1975, 
281-283; Koplin, 1971, p. 130; and Liebenstein, 1976.) Indeed, it is usually 
associated with 'Paretian optimality', a term seldom used at all in human 
services -- for good reason. 
In economics, 'efficiency' refers to a putatively objective criterion for 
assessing the performance of multi-actor economic systems, not the 
performance of individual actors.  A system is said to be 'efficient' or Pareto-
optimal, when no decision can be made to improve the welfare of one actor 
without, simultaneously, harming the welfare of another.  (Heilbroner and 
Thurow, 1975, 281-283; Koplin, 1971, p.130) 
Several objections to applying this (as opposed to the engineering) concept 
come to mind immediately:  First, almost all authorities who speak of 
'efficiency' in human services explicitly or implicitly endorse the input-output 
notion from engineering and not anything remotely related to Pareto 
optimality.  Secondly, applications of this concept to human services appear 
to be diversionary, at best.  For example, there is little actual concern for the 
efficiency of multi-actor human service systems (e.g., community service 
delivery systems) in contrast to single-actor systems (e.g., individuals and 
agencies).  If one is concerned with communities, however, one wonders how 
appropriate a criterion Paretian efficiency would be in that case, since it 
appears to suggest that funding decisions are optimal, for example, when no 
agency or individual can gain an increase in funding except at the expense of 
some other agency or individual.  In that sense, most agencies and workers 
are arguably efficient most or all of the time, and the more scarce resources 
become the more efficient they become.  Further, by this standard, systems 
would appear to be more efficient at times of reallocation than during original 
allocation.  Finally, economists themselves question the neutrality of the 
concept of efficiency.  Thurow and Heilbroner, for example, find in it at least 
two significant value judgements (1975, 282).  Thus, one must ask, if the 
promise of objectivity and value-neutrality is removed from efficiency, 
wherein lies its claim to preference over other values and criteria?  An 




One would expect from human service literature that standard works on 
the economics of services should be heavily grounded in the topic efficiency.  
Yet such standard works as Becker's Human Capital and Fuchs' The Service 
Economy don't even mention the term in their indexes, and the McGraw-Hill 
Encyclopedia of Economics contains no listing on efficiency (Becker, 1975; 
Fuchs, 1968; Greenwalt, 1982). These considerations explain why efficiency 
has played a relatively slight role in economics, and arguably ought to be 
ignored in human services as well.   
No Operational Definitions 
Operational definition is a widely recognized social science concept. It 
refers to operational, or “practical” definition of a concept in terms of its 
measurement in cases where there may or may not also be a nominal 
definition.  Thus, a widely utilized operational definition of intelligence is in 
terms of scores on the Stanford-Binet IQ Test.  A higher score is generally 
understood to indicate higher intelligence. Likewise, for many people, annual 
income represents an operational definition of economic well-being. 
The word efficiency occurs regularly in both the periodical literature and 
published books concerning human service administration and evaluation, 
sometimes with a nominal definition but more often with the implicit 
understanding that no definition is required; that everyone knows what is 
meant by the notion. And yet, the reality is that efficiency is, like beauty, 
most often in the eye of the beholder. Further, not a single published study of 
the actual efficiency of any actual human service program or class of services 
sufficient to justify a judgment of whether or not that particular service was 
operating efficiently can be found anywhere. 
Perhaps the single most common effort to operationalize efficiency in 
human services is through measurement of unit costs.  However justified unit 
cost measurement may be in its own right, any association to efficiency is at 
this point strictly ad hoc and (in the vernacular) "off the wall".  As such, there 
is no need to deal with this approach in a theoretical sense. 
 
Unavoidable Difficulties 
 In general management, as in the human services, the most frequently 
quoted definition of efficiency is the engineering and not the economic one:  
the ratio of inputs to outputs.  This definition appears to be dependent upon 
the technological production metaphor discussed above, or the model of an 
agency as a machine for producing (in the technological, not the economic 
sense) 'service output' (corresponding with the physical concept of 'work' as 
the output of machines) since without it the terms 'input' and 'output' remain 
undefined.  The 'open systems' approach to organizations makes this physical 
analogy quite explicitly.  (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 150-161)  
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Since, as we have already seen, the production model is inappropriate in 
the case of human services, the entire quest for precision and exact 
measurement appears to come apart at this point.  The problem is not merely 
a measurement issue, as so often suggested.  The real problem with the 
mechanical concept of efficiency is that it simply cannot be meaningfully 
applied to social acts like services and however much the language of the 
production metaphor or 'open systems’ obscure that fact, human services 
consist almost entirely of social acts.  Because human services, unlike 
physical movements, are not governed by the law of conservation of matter 
and energy, we cannot meaningfully define a scale of 'perfect efficiency' (from 
0% to 100%) and because we cannot, talk of 'inputs' and 'outputs' even if 
these terms were definable, the issue comes down to ordinal (rank-order) 
comparisons of greater of lesser efficiency at best.  Although no less an 
authority than Herbert Simon made this point convincingly more than three 
decades ago, usage of the input-output ratio imagery continues to ignore it 
entirely: 
 
It must be noted that there is a difference in computing an 
output-input ratio in the physical and in the social sciences.  For 
the engineer, both output and input are measured in terms of 
energy.  The law of conservation of energy tells him that the 
output of useful energy cannot exceed the energy input.  Hence 
arises the concept of 'perfect efficiency' – that  is, a situation in 
which output equals input.  In the social sciences output and 
input are seldom measured in comparable units; and even when 
they are, as in a comparison of cost of fire protection with dollar 
losses from fire, there is no 'law of conservation of energy' which 
prevents the output from exceeding the input.  Hence the 
concept of perfect efficiency, if it is used at all, must be 
redefined.  (Simon, 1976, 181) 
 
Here we come down to the very heart of the issue.  Simon offers us the key 
to understanding:  Simply because we cannot assume anything analogous to 
the conservation of energy in social phenomena, we further cannot rely on 
perfect efficiency as any find of meaningful normative criterion.  Efficiency 
ratios of 150, 200, or even 1,000 percent might conceivably be normal in 
human services.  We simply have no reliable means of assuming what is 
normal, without the 'zero point' implicit in perfect efficiency, where the 
amount of energy output equals the amount of energy input. 
Simon also makes another even more interesting point, however: 
Actual problems, as they present themselves to the 
administrator, are always concerned with relative efficiencies, 
and no measure of absolute efficiency is ever needed.  
Moreover, the theory does not require a numerical measure of 
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efficiency, but merely a comparison of greater or less between 
the efficiencies of two alternative possibilities.  Under these 
circumstances, the definitions of efficiency as a ratio of the 
actual to the maximum possible amount to the same thing.  
(Simon, 1976, p. 181) [emphasis added] 
 
This is an extraordinary statement for anyone who has followed the 
unfolding of efficiency concepts in human services, with the multiple repeated 
claims for the necessity and desirability of quantitative measurement in 
pursuit of some standard of absolute efficiency.  When a leading authority on 
the subject indicates that the only measurements necessary are qualitative 
and comparative, the foundations of the case for quantifications and ratios in 
this area really begin to crumble.   And, one might add, even if such limited 
comparisons are made, such comparisons are often completely meaningless 
unless those services being compared are shown to be directly and completely 
comparable.  Thus, to suggest that counseling dying patients is 'more' or 'less' 
efficient than health education for pregnant women is a complete exercise in 
futility, and even in cases where different services bearing the same name 
(e.g., 'foster care') great caution must be exercised because standardization of 
services to the level necessary for meaningful comparisons seldom exists in 
human service acts. To suggest, in other words, that two similarly named 
services which are quite different in operation can be compared it to suggest 
something like a comparison of apples and oranges.  
So Why Do We Need Efficiency Anyway? 
One of the most fundamental questions involves the matter of why some 
people think we need a concept of efficiency, whether absolute or relative, 
quantitatively measurable or qualitatively comparative. The first and most 
important point, as Simon noted in the quotation above, is that the concept of 
efficiency is never needed in the administration of human services in any 
absolute sense. When questions of efficiencies arise they are always relative. 
The idea of efficiency in ordinary usage is often little more than some kind 
of linguistic indicator of exemplary or laudable behavior; as such, it appears 
to be deeply embedded in American, European or western culture in some 
fundamental sense (Searle, 1971). Much of this sense is easily found. In 1917, 
General George Pershing, for example, cabled from his European 
headquarters, “No other organization since the world began has ever done 
such great constructive work with the efficiency, dispatch and understanding, 
often under adverse circumstances than has been done in France by 
American Red Cross in the last six months.”  
In this sense, the continued interest in efficiency is understandable, even 
justifiable.  When combined with pseudo-technical definitions like those 
discussed above, the concept appears to promise an unambiguous, objective 
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standard by which to evaluate and compare alternatives for a single decision, 
or to compare different decisions, or even decisions with results, as the Brace, 
et. al, and Lee definitions suggest.  Further, by virtue of its long usage and 
association with the exacting disciplines of engineering and economics, the 
concept conjures up expectations of precise measurement, precise 
determinations, and an ostensibly scientific basis for social action. 
Without assumptions of the useful (and implicit) standard of 'perfect 
efficiency' the most one should expect is an ordinal level criterion for rank 
ordering pairs of alternatives as 'more' or 'less' efficient than one another. 
(Simon, 1976, 179-181) No further generalizability can be justified or should 
be necessary. 
 Accountability in Human Services  
The widespread misconception in human services that economics is the 
science of money offers a strong – albeit inappropriate – basis for the entry of 
economic theory into management thinking in human services.  The need to 
be accountable for contributed, donated and granted money-revenues has 
always imposed strong, but ambiguous, expectations on human service 
agencies -- expectations which are currently summarized with the term 
'accountability'.  As Karst noted two decades ago:  
 
There remains substantial unanimity on one goal:  the 
greatest possible portion of the wealth donated to private 
charity must be conserved and used to further the 
charitable public purpose; waste must be minimized and 
diversion of public funds for private gain is intolerable.  
(Karst, 1960, p.433) 
 
Karst incorporated in this brief statement most of the dominant themes of 
the contemporary concern for accountability in social agencies, as well as at 
least three distinguishable conceptions of 'efficiency' as 'wealth conservation' 
(or, cost reduction), 'waste minimization', and 'prevention of malfeasance' (or, 
improper actions).  All three of these are, of course, worthwhile, legitimate, 
and immanently practical concerns.  However, all of them are readily 
meaningful in conventional, everyday non-technical language, and none of 
them is clearly or unambiguously extended, refined or measured by using 
economic or engineering concepts of 'production' or 'efficiency' and none bears 
a necessary or sufficient logical relationship to the production metaphor.  
In response to these traditional concerns, which have been at issue for 
human services throughout the twentieth century, a strong but uncritical 
body of opinion has grown up among social workers, agency administrators, 
board members and others that these practical concerns are best protected 
when social agencies use their resources 'efficiently'. 
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For example, in 1929 Porter Lee spoke confidently in his presidential 
address to the National Conference of Social Work about the superiority of 
the social agency over other forms of human service, placing primary 
emphasis for his claims on the test of efficiency.  (Lee, 1937, p. 19)   What Lee 
was, in fact,  suggesting was that a predominant climate of opinion had 
developed  favoring organized service delivery in agencies, and grounded in 
the everyday experience of social workers of the time that things could have 
done better through organized services delivery. 
In a similar vein two decades earlier, the Cleveland Chamber of 
Commerce required agencies which it funded to agree 'to cooperate with other 
charitable institutions in promoting efficiency and economy of administration 
in the charities of the city as a whole, and in preventing duplication of effort' 
(Lubove, 1965, p. 180).  That latter phrase is very revealing, suggesting as is 
does, yet another concept of efficiency as 'unduplicated effort'.  Needless to 
say, this concept like those noted by Karst, bears no necessary or sufficient 
relationship to either engineering or economic theory. 
The Cleveland quote, in particular, is significant because it predates the 
(engineering-based) Taylorist, scientific management concept of efficiency as 
the ratio of input-to-output discussed above.  In fact, it probably corresponds 
more closely to the approach of Porter -- the ratio between effort and result --
which to the modern eye thoroughly merges 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' and 
uses the term ratio more metaphorically than analytically. 
As such, it reveals clearly what may not otherwise be apparent:  1)  The 
usage of 'efficiency' in human service discussions has remained remarkably 
consistent through the 20th century, and 2)  That usage is primarily a 
qualitative, moral and philosophical one which predates and differs markedly 
from both the quantitative engineering and economic usages.  The 
remarkably modern quality of the Cleveland quotation from 1910 and the 
Karst observation from 1960 show this clearly.  In point of fact, when human 
services are urged to be efficient, what has always been meant is the moral 
injunction to 'be prudent, thrifty, and avoid impropriety and needlessly 
duplicating the efforts of others'. What would be meant by the imposition of 
economic or engineering concepts of efficiency in this case, by contrast, would 
be the sanction either that raw material inputs employed by service-
producers should be so employed as to maximize physical outputs or that 
service delivery systems should be organized to be Pareto-optimal.  While 
these notions are easily devolved into moral terms, its exact and quantitative 
measurement (the 'test of efficiency; referred to by Lee, the production 
function of economics, or the exact ratio of engineering) continues to elude us.   
The simple fact is that no widely accepted or generally recognized test of 
efficiency exists or has existed.  In fact, one cannot find a single published 
example of such a 'test' applied to a real human service problem which meets 
these rigorous definitional criteria and has even elementary face validity.  
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Thus, it is highly unlikely that any real human service decision has been 
made in this century for which efficiency was the sole or primary criterion.  
Indeed, if one reads the literature on efficiency closely, admissions of its 
probable impossibility can be found!  (C.F. Burkhead and Hennigan, 1978, 
p.34) 
While the optimistic (and positivistic) among us appear to believe that an 
exact test will emerge in the slow but steady progress of management 
science, there is strong reason to believe that such hopes are grounded in the 
unjustified assumptions that 1)  because economics and human services 
employ the common term 'services' they refer to an identical phenomenon;  2)  
because the production metaphor and terminology have become popular for 
describing human services, economic perspectives on production can be easily 
applied. 
This view also assumes, without explanation, that the centuries old 
economic and legal traditions of differentiating 'for-profit' and non-profit' (or, 
more to the point, non-market) enterprise are no longer justified.  (C.F. Cyert, 
1975, for a defense of this view.)  However, there are at least three major 
reasons to treat non-profit human service enterprise as part of the broader 
class of non-profit activities.  First, there is the heuristic:  This convention 
makes at least as much sense as classifying all organizations -- profit and 
non-profit -- as production units, and doing so creates a number of 
distinctions not possible when profit and nonprofit are merged.  Secondly, 
with the exception of some explicitly governmental entities such as public 
health and public welfare, most human services are created as non-profit 
corporations.  Thirdly, all non-profits regardless of program or function are 
treated as a class in statutory and public law (Oleck, 1982). 
When we classify human services, however, as part of the larger class of 
non-profit enterprise, some very interesting questions arise.  For, in this 
same class are such other 'charitable' (in the legal sense) activities as 
community theatre groups, art museums, churches, symphony orchestras and 
political parties and interest groups.  Is it reasonable, therefore, to question 
the efficiency of a production of Hamlet?  Can the ratio of input to output of a 
display of Chinese water colors be measured?  Or, who would be foolhardy 
enough to question the efficiency of a reading of the Talmud, a communion 
service or high mass?  While one can draw many comparisons between 
Beethoven and Brahms, a comparison on the efficiency of their respective 
symphonies seems absurd to say the least.  Are Republicans more efficient 
campaigners that Democrats? 
Focusing more directly on the accountability issue, do people make 
symphony contributions because the oboes have a good input/output ratio?  
Can ministers, priests and rabbis be compared for the efficiency (or even the 
effectiveness) of their  services (yet another meaning of that term!).  Merely 
to pose such questions is to expose their absurdity.  Yet, proponents of 
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efficiency measurement ask us to ignore completely  the similarities of actor, 
priest, conductor, curator and social worker (In the words of the social work 
cliche, they all 'work with people') and address instead the similarities 
between smelting pig iron and counseling terminal cancer patients! 
It should be clear at this point that one of the major effects of downplaying 
the distinction between profit and non-profit organizations is to obscure the 
absurdities of efficiency assessment in at least some non-profits, and to 
substitute the 'production analogy' (e.g., between manufacturing and helping) 
while downplaying the 'charitable activities analogy' (e.g., between the 
performance of Mozart and Family Therapy). 
If the case for measuring efficiency in the engineering sense, is justified 
for human services, then certainly all of these assessments of non-profit 
activities are justified as well. 
Conversely, if they are mere foolishness, as it appears they are, then it 
must be concluded that efficiency measurement of non-profit human services 
on the strength of a vague call for 'accountability' is similarly foolish.  Thus, 
we must conclude that in the absence of an independent, full-scale 
justification of the reasons why 'efficiency' should be a major consideration in 
the evaluation of human services when it is not justified in the case of other 
non-profit enterprise, no such justification exists.  In the recent past, the 
production-analogy has served this purpose.  However, as we have seen 
above, this also is unacceptable, because the key terms 'service', 'production', 
and 'efficiency' have different, even conflicting, meanings in economics, 
engineering and human services.  Far from being simply nuances of 
difference, these different meanings are also incompatible in the different 
contexts. 
Conclusion 
What has this exercise in examining the implications of economics for 
human services decision-making established?  First, it should be clear by now 
that there simply is no strong case at present for the likelihood that the use 
of economic theory will significantly improve human services decision-
making.  As we have seen, those applications are grounded in false analogies, 
and willful or naive misuses of similar terms defined quite differently in 
economics and human services, as well as an account of the nature of 
economics which is itself controversial among economists., 
The quest for efficiency in human services, like I.M. Mortal’s search for 
Appalachian unicorns, is an exercise in futility that has been going on for 
more than a century without noticeable result. 
While the differences in the economic and human service concepts of 
'service' and 'production' are important theoretical points, it is really in the 
critical concept of efficiency where the case for the superiority of economics 
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breaks down completely:  That concept is not central to micro-economic 
theory (of the firm, or its non-profit analogue, the agency), of questionable 
applicability to supra-agency, or community, decisions, not objective, as it is 
often said to be, not currently measurable despite a 70-year history of 
practical interest, and (in engineering) its implicit materialism.  One can 
wonder how such an anachronism has managed to survive as it has.  Indeed, 
after a careful search of the literature, it can be suggested that it may well be 
that only indifference to close scrutiny of the concept on the part of those who 
use it has kept the idea of 'efficient' human services alive for so many years.  
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